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BOOK REVIEW
Ranee K L. Panjabi*
Vietnam's Intervention in Cambodia in International Law. Gary
Klintworth. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service,
1989. Pp. 193. Paper, $24.95.
Gary Klintworth is a Senior Research Fellow at Australian National
University, Canberra. He is both an international lawyer and a strategic
analyst and served as an Australian Army Intelligence Officer specializ-
ing in Cambodian affairs. In this book he examines the 1978
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia from the perspective of international
law and concludes that this military action can be deemed both an act of
legitimate self-defense and an example of humanitarian intervention
because Vietnam, in staving off Cambodian aggression, also rescued the
Cambodian people from the genocidal horror of the Pol Pot regime.
The concept of humanitarian intervention has been gaining interna-
tional acceptance, or at least passive acquiescence, in recent decades
especially in cases where the intervening nation withdraws its troops at
the earliest available opportunity, thereby demonstrating its good faith.
The Indian invasion of East Pakistan in 1971 and the Tanzanian invasion
of Uganda in 1979 are frequently cited as classic examples of humanitar-
ian intervention which ameliorated the plight of millions of hapless vic-
tims of oppression.
However, there are serious problems implicit in the widespread
acceptance of the idea of humanitarian intervention as a legitimate state
action. First, the concept may be a violation of the United Nations Char-
ter which states "[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations."' The Charter further limits
the resort to force to "individual or collective self-defense if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security. ' '2 Should intervention be necessary, such action would be
under United Nations auspices according to Chapter VII of the Charter.
Clearly, the Charter does not give carte blanche to individual states to
intervene unilaterally in the internal affairs of another nation.
* LL.B. (Hons.), London. Associate Professor of History, Memorial University,
Canada.
1. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
2. Id art. 51.
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Despite these prohibitions on the use of force, it has to be
remembered that the United Nations is also actively committed to
implementation of its various human rights instruments. When a gov-
ernment which commits genocide against its own people dearly violates
these international agreements, there may well be a need for a neighbor-
ing state to intervene to reestablish the basic rights of the victimized
population. Such action might include the overthrow of the government
committing genocide. This is obviously a case of conflicting values
(state sovereignty vs. human rights considerations) and one which
requires much soul searching.
The opponents of humanitarian intervention point to the U.N.
Charter and caution against any justification for violating the territorial
integrity of a nation state. The statist emphasis of global politics would
dearly be at odds with any notion of a nation's obligation or right to
interfere in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. Those who oppose
the concept emphasize the likelihood of abuse of the idea of
humanitarian intervention by a state seeking economic or political domi-
nation and using humanitarian reasons as a cloak for its real motives.
The use of humanitarian intervention would dictate different priori-
ties; priorities which would rank the rights of peoples far above those of
their governments. If there are gross violations of human rights involv-
ing mass extermination and torture, the proponents of intervention
argue that non-intervention is the most crass form of cruelty and indiffer-
ence to the plight of the victims. As Fonteyne in his Introduction to this
book explains:
If one therefore accepts that preservation of human life (rather than the
sanctity of the nation-state) is at the apex of an universal scale of values,
the prevention of persistent, large scale threats to such life has to be
regarded as the ultimate goal of the United Nations system...s
The problem is compounded by the fact that the United Nations has
not lived up to the precepts of the Charter. The chasm between interna-
tionalist principles and actual U.N. practice is now so wide that the
world organization is generally deemed to be incapable of effective
implementation of its own Charter. The existence of the veto in the
Security Council has hindered U.N. action on a number of occasions.
The very powers which should lead by example toward U.N. aims, para-
lyze the organization by lending support to client states which flout the
principles of international law, secure in the knowledge that their patron
states in the Security Council will prevent any retributive action. This is
precisely what happened with Cambodia. Although U.N. action might
have been the most desirable alternative, it was not forthcoming, mainly
because China (Pol Pot's patron), a permanent Member of the Security
Council, could hinder any U.N. measures.
3. Fonteyne, Introduction to G. KUNTWORTH, VIMWAM)S INTERVEN77ON IN CAMBO-
DIA IN INTERNATIONAL LAw at xii (1989).
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Klintworth begins his study of the Vietnam-Cambodia war in this
book by explaining the geographic and historical background of Cambo-
dia, a small country with a population of 6.5 million with large neigh-
bors-Thailand (population 54.5 million) and Vietnam (population 65
million).4 Internal dissension and foreign interference have marked
Cambodia's violent history. In 1975, one faction of the Khmer Rouge
overthrew Lon Nol and assumed power under Pol Pot. Soon after, "the
killings began." As Klintworth explains:
Life became much tougher, food rations were cut and it was soon appar-
ent that the goal of the new Cambodian rulers was to radically change the
nature of Khmer society. Professional, intellectual or technical people
were, apparently, not needed. Merchants, bankers, teachers, lawyers, civil
servants, doctors, dentists, dressmakers, railroad engineers, pedicab driv-
ers, cooks, waiters, maids and truck drivers were unwanted "leeches and
parasites." Cities were viewed as creatures of Western influence, centres
of decadence and conspicuous consumption, and impediments to change.
Technology, money and trade were regarded as evil. 6
The horror lasted for three years, from 1975 until the Vietnamese
intervention in late 1978. Sir Robert Jackson, Under Secretary General
and Senior Advisor to the United Nations described Cambodia as
suffering:
ceaseless killings . . . torture, persecution, iron discipline ruthlessly
imposed, hunger, starvation, deprivation of even the most elementary
essentials of life. Some of the methods of torture and execution were, if
anything, more obscene than those practiced by the Nazis and degraded
the human mind and body in ways never known before ... two million
Kampucheans-a quarter of the entire population-perished represent-
ing genocide on a scale never before witnessed in terms of a single coun-
try [and] rarely in history has the entire population of a nation been
subjected to such bestial and inhuman treatment as that endured by the
Kampuchean people under Pol Pot.7
In the same time frame, border incidents became frequent between
Vietnam and Cambodia as Pol Pot's violent anti-Vietnamese propaganda
intensified. That Cambodia was the initial aggressor appears now to be
widely accepted. Prince Norodom Sihanouk, leader in exile of the
Cambodian people, blamed the Khmer Rouge for provoking Vietnam.8
Klintworth states, "On all the evidence and on the balance of probabili-
ties it seems reasonable to say that the Khmer Rouge were first to use
force and that they went out of their way to provoke the Vietnamese." 9
The author traces the origins of the war between Cambodia and
Vietnam and examines Vietnam's attempts to negotiate a settlement.
4. G. KuLNwoRTH, VIETNAM's INVERVENTION IN CAMBODIA IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw 1 (1989).
5. Id at 6.
6. Id
7. id at 6-7.
8. Id. at 18.
9. Id.
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These attempts were rejected by the Cambodian government. Accord-
ing to journalist Wilfred Burchett, Vietnam tried to secure a mediation
mission from the United Nations and was apparently "blocked by
China."' 0 In his book The China Cambodia Vietnam Triangle, Burchett
revealed that China exerted pressure to scuttle a Non-Aligned good
offices mission to assist the warring states," and even lobbied exten-
sively but unsuccessfully to have Vietnam expelled from the Non-
Aligned Movement.' 2 Burchett found another Chinese motivation for
its support of Pol Pot:
Whereas Vietnam had stubbornly refused to be placed in China's pocket,
Pol Pot had jumped into it himself. China has been charged on many
occasions with being interested in fighting the United States to the last
Vietnamese and was certainly no less averse to fighting Vietnam to the
last Kampuchean.' 3
Burchett and Klintworth present compelling evidence of the extent of
Chinese involvement in Cambodian affairs during the Pol Pot regime.
That China should have lent such extensive support to a regime practic-
ing genocide is not very surprising now in view of the Chinese govern-
ment's bloody massacre of its own citizens during the 1989 Tienanmen
Movement.
Clearly, Vietnam had no choice but to repel Cambodian forces
which were inflicting heavy casualties on Vietnamese civilians in the bor-
der villages. Vietnamese statistics, cited by Klintworth, indicate that
between 1977 and 1978 the Khmer Rouge destroyed twenty-five town-
ships and ninety-six villages. Between 250,000 and 300,000 people lost
their homes and the death toll of Vietnamese soldiers was 30,000.14
Klintworth's careful research of the evidence leads him to conclude
quite convincingly that Vietnam's Christmas Day invasion of Cambodia
in 1978 and its destruction of the Pol Pot government in twelve days was
"a reasonable act of self-defence."' 15 Given Cambodia's aggressive
attacks and the Chinese attempt to block peaceful initiatives through the
United Nations, Vietnam had little room to maneuver. The extent of
Chinese support for the Cambodian regime of Pol Pot might have dic-
tated caution in the minds of Vietnam's leaders, but the provocation
from Cambodia was too great for them. The relative ease with which
Vietnam destroyed the Pol Pot government testifies to the lack of sup-
port for that regime among its own people.
The crucial issue of international law posed in this book is not
whether Vietnam's invasion constitutes self-defense. The controversial
aspect of this study stems from the author's commitment to the view that
the Vietnamese invasion can be considered an example of humanitarian
10. W. BURCHET, THE CHINA CAMBODIA VIETNAM TRIANGLE 161 (1981).
11. Id.
12. Id at 162.
13. Id at 149.
14. G. KLINrWORTH, supra note 4, at 23-24.
15. Id at 28.
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intervention. While admitting that "Vietnam has not been a strong pro-
ponent of such an argument in its invasion and occupation of
Kampuchea,"' 6 Klintworth believes that "... Vietnam's use of force to
overthrow the Khmer Rouge meets, on the whole, all the criteria for an
excusable humanitarian intervention."1 7
Klintworth makes out a persuasive case for his rather contro-,ersial
thesis. His testing criteria for determining whether Vietnam's actions
qualify as humanitarian intervention are:
1. "The human rights threatened ought to be fundamental
ones."
18
2. "There should be a situation of extreme deprivation that shocks
the conscience of mankind." 19
3. "There should be a sustained large-scale loss of life or immi-
nent risk of a continuation thereof; it should not be an isolated
incident." 20
4. "The state authorities ought to be unable or unwilling to pre-
vent the violation of human rights."'2 1
5. There should be consent, but it is not mandatory. 22
6. There "should have been a failure to act by the United
Nations." 23
7. "Other peaceful alternatives had been tried and failed, leaving
[the intervening state] with few options."'24
8. "The invading state should be impartial and disinterested
"25
9. "The proportionality rule: [there should be] minimum impact
on authority structures, though this may be unavoidable." 26
10. "The operation should be limited and as non-coercive and
neutral as possible."127
11. There should be "[a] prompt disengagement .... ,,28
12. There should be "[s]upervision by and reporting to the United
Nations." 29
To prove that Vietnam's action qualifies as humanitarian interven-
tion, Klintworth draws on both primary and secondary sources. His
conclusions about the gruesome nature of the Pol Pot regime are now
16. IM at 41.
17. IM. at 76.
18. Id at 60.
19. Id at 63.
20. Id
21. Id at 64.
22. Id at 65.
23. Id at 66.
24. Id at 67.
25. Id at 68.
26. Id at 70.
27. Id at 71.
28. Id at 73.
29. Id at 74.
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universally believed. That the conscience of the world has been shocked
is now amply evident. The sheer madness of a government which ter-
rorized people simply because they wore glasses almost defies compre-
hension. Accounts of numbers vary but the range of the massacres is so
vast and the victims (now nothing but heaps of skulls and bones) are so
numerous that all the world should feel responsible for letting such bar-
barity continue without intervention.
Motivating the killings was the following policy of the Khmer
Rouge: "[i]n the new Kampuchea, one million people will suffice to con-
tinue the revolution. One million good revolutionaries will be enough
for the society that we are building. The others we do not need."30 The
main annual killing season was in July, after the harvest.3 1 "The worst
wave of executions took place in 1978 and continued throughout the
year as tension with Vietnam intensified and internal resistance
increased."'3 2 Careful records were kept by the Pol Pot Government
with details of interrogations, torture confessions, and executions. The
victims were routinely photographed. These pictures reveal that a
number of women and children were declared enemies of the state. Pic-
tures also show that foreigners were not exempt. There is pictorial evi-
dence of two Australians, one Indian and one American-all victims of
the Khmer Rouge.3 3
One reason why the world showed little interest in this tragedy was
that the Pol Pot Government had cut off most information links to the
outside world. Telephone, cable, and airline connections were sev-
ered.34 Few foreign journalists ventured into Cambodia.
Wilfred Burchett's conclusions about the lack of available informa-
tion match those of Klintworth. Burchett recounted a meeting with a
Yugoslavian diplomat at the Belgrade Conference of the Non-Aligned
Movement in July 1978. The Yugoslavian diplomat, Milan Marcovich
stated that his country was "the best placed in the West to know" about
events in Cambodia because the Yugoslavs had "maintained an embassy
there all the time." He then told Burchett about mutual friends who had
been killed by the Khmer Rouge.3 5 Burchett commented:
What was extraordinary at Belgrade-and in February 1979 at a meeting
of the Non-Aligneds' Coordinating Bureau in Maputo (Mozambique) and
even more so at the Non-Aligneds' summit in Havana in September
1979-was that Yugoslavia took the lead in stubbornly defending the Pol
Pot Regime. It continued to do so later at the United Nations. That the
"best informed" Western country would do this is explainable only by
Yugoslavia's intimate relations with the United States and its new-found
friendship with China.3 6
30. Id. at 64.
31. Id
32. Id
33. Id at 65.
34. Id at 67.
35. W. BURCHETr, supra note 10, at 161-62.
36. I at 162.
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United Nations inaction was serious enough; U.N. actions are even
more questionable. The United Nations has voted to give the Coalition
Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK)-which includes the
ousted Khmer Rouge-the Cambodian seat in the United Nations.
According to Klintworth:
The Khmer Rouge comprise a major part of the Coalition Government of
Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) formed in 1982 and has been allocated
the Cambodian seat at the United Nations ever since. It was only in
November 1988 that the United Nations General Assembly included a
reference in its annual resolution on the situation in Kampuchea to the
non-return to Cambodia of the Khmer Rouge policies and practices of
1975-78. 3 7
In such cases of genocide, Klintworth concludes, the U.N. has failed to
take effective action. "The performance of the United Nations has been
negative, evasive and protective of the offending government .... ,,as
One of the main arguments advanced by opponents of Vietnam's
intervention refers to that nation's alleged desire to Vietnamize Cambo-
dia. Critics have pointed to Vietnam's historic interest in Cambodia, the
long duration of its involvement in this particular conflict and its appar-
ent desire to ensure the survival of a pro-Vietnamese government in
Cambodia. Klintworth disagrees and believes that ".... there is little
evidence of an attempt by Vietnam to colonize or Vietnamize Cambo-
dia."3 9 He argues that the scale of the Cambodian disaster necessitated
extensive Vietnamese involvement in rebuilding the country. As he
explains:
Some of the claims of Vietnamization of Cambodia may be due to the fact
that Vietnam initially had to run a country that had been virtually turned
upside down. Its infrastructure had been destroyed. When the
Vietnamese arrived in 1979 Cambodia's schools and hospitals were
neglected and their grounds overgrown "like forests." Phnom Penh was
an empty city. Its central bank had been blown up, shops and villas had
been smashed and looted, factories were at a standstill and the streets
were knee-deep in broken furniture and rubble: "It was a wasteland of
decaying and melancholy buildings drowning in garbage." Vietnam had
to provide administrators, teachers, doctors, engineers and skilled per-
sonnel because almost the entire Kampuchean technical and intellectual
class had been eliminated by the Khmer Rouge. Too much of
Kampuchea's culture, agriculture, industry, morale and spirit had been
destroyed. There was no infrastructure, no currency, no markets, no
banks, no transport, no trains, no telephones, no electricity, and the like.
Of Kampuchea's 20,000 teachers only 7,000 survived; and of its 450 or
so doctors only 45 remained. 40
While Klintworth's evidence generally applies well to the twelve cri-
teria he sets forth, he does admit there are flaws in the argument. As
37. G. KLINTWORTH, supra note 4, at 66.
38. Id. at 67.
39. Id. at 69.
40. Id. at 69-70 (citation omitted).
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regards the proportionality rule, for example, Klintworth argues that
"Vietnam's response was unquestionably disproportionate. ' 4 1
Klintworth feels that the serious human rights violations must be fac-
tored in when assessing proportionality. He concludes that "[t]he
extraordinary circumstances in Kampuchea called for an extraordinary
solution." 4 2
The most serious flaw in the argument justifying this invasion as a
humanitarian intervention relates to the lengthy duration of the
Vietnamese military presence in Cambodia. Despite repeated calls by
the United Nations for a withdrawal of Vietnamese forces, the latter
have remained in Cambodia since the invasion, and "[s]ome analysts
believe as many as 8,000 to 10,000 combat troops have returned" to
support the pro-Vietnamese government of Hun Sen which is engaged
in warfare against the Khmer Rouge operating along the border with
Thailand.4 3 It does not appear likely that Vietnam will disengage
militarily from Cambodian affairs while there is even a remote possibility
that the dreaded Khmer Rouge might return to power. Indeed, as
Klintworth explains, this apprehension about a return of the Khmer
Rouge has given Vietnam justification for remaining in Cambodia.
"Khmer Rouge access to sanctuaries in Thailand, and the provision of
supplies of money and weapons from China, the United States and Sin-
gapore have enabled the Khmer Rouge to survive as a threat to both
Vietnam's security and to the Kampuchean people."'44
Though there is growing international recognition that the genoci-
dal Khmer Rouge must not be allowed to return to power, the very pres-
ence of Khmer Rouge delegates at peace initiatives blocks all hopes for a
viable solution. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher voiced inter-
national concern during her August 1988 visit to a refugee camp near
the Cambodian border. She said "[t]he Vietnamese must go, but we
must not allow the return of the terrible Pol Pot regime in their place.
No civilized country could accept that."' 45 However, recent peace initia-
tives in Jakarta, Indonesia broke down largely because of a Khmer
Rouge veto.4 6 Khmer Rouge Leader, Khieu Samphan, "often described
as the 'acceptable face' of the reviled Khmer Rouge,"' 4 7 scuttled the seri-
ous attempt to solve the Cambodian crisis. As Bryan Johnson of the
Toronto Globe and Mail commented of the Khmer Rouge, "[a]lthough
they now pay lip service to liberal democracy, nothing in their demeanor
indicates a fundamental change."'4 8 Earlier, a Cambodian hospital
administrator told Johnson, "if you had lived under Pol Pot, you would
41. Id at 70.
42. Id at 71.
43. Globe and Mail (Toronto), Mar. 3, 1990, at D3, col. 1.
44. G. KINiwORTH, supra note 4, at 73.
45. The Times (London), Aug. 8, 1988, at 6, col. 1.
46. Globe and Mail (Toronto), Mar. 3, 1990, at D3, col. 1.
47. Id.
48. Ido
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understand that it is a nightmare we cannot keep away." 49
Klintworth believes that "Cambodians have been relatively well dis-
posed towards the Vietnamese army: any opposition seems to have been
subsumed beneath the greater fear that the Khmer Rouge could
return." 50 He also feels that the long tenure of Vietnamese involvement
was caused by circumstances beyond Vietnam's control which made a
prompt withdrawal impossible. "[A]nybody who has been to Cambodia
can only give credit to the achievements of the Vietnamese administra-
tion and the accompanying progress of the PRK government in restor-
ing order, life, independence and hope to the country." 51 Vietnamese
moves to overthrow the Pol Pot regime were supported by the people of
Cambodia who are now fearful about an imminent return this year,
1990, of the hated Khmer Rouge.
While Klintworth's plea on behalf of Vietnam is eloquent and per-
suasive, it may not exert a major influence on the minds of policy makers
either in the large countries or even among Vietnam's Asian neighbors.
True, the revealed atrocities have caused some embarrassment to those
countries supporting the Khmer Rouge. China, once Pol Pot's most
staunch supporter, no longer assumes that the Khmer Rouge will domi-
nate Cambodia,52 only that, as a faction, the Khmer Rouge could partici-
pate in a proposed quadripartite government which would also include
Prince Sihanouk.53 Furthermore, China has recently not "objected in
principle to ... [an] enhanced United Nations role .... 4"
However, revulsion against the Khmer Rouge has not yet translated
into universal applause for Vietnam's action in saving the Cambodians,
nor is this likely in the near future. The invasion is still often referred to
as an act of aggression. While Klintworth's scholarship will undoubtedly
increase awareness of the issues, acceptance of his claim that
Vietnamese actions can be deemed humanitarian intervention may not
be forthcoming for quite some time.
In his recent book, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and
Morality, Fernando R. Tes6n suggested that "humanitarian intervention
is consistent with the present international legal order."55 Tes6n
defined humanitarian intervention as "the proportionate transboundary
help, including forcible help, provided by governments to individuals in
another state who are being denied basic human rights and who them-
selves would be rationally willing to revolt against their oppressive gov-
ernment."' 56 Klintworth's conclusion that "[t]here may . . .be a legal
and moral obligation on neighboring states to intervene, on the basis of
49. Globe and Mail (Toronto), Sept. 12, 1989, at Al.
50. G. KuNTWORTH, supra note 4, at 72.
51. Id. at 77.
52. The Times (London), July 16, 1988, at 9, col. 1.
53. N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1990, at A6, col. 1.
54. Id.
55. F. TEs6N, HuMANrrARuN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTo LAW AND MoaAx.rA=
5 (1988).
56. IE
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a higher universal morality that transcends the boundaries of parochial
state interests,"' 57 is similar to Tes6n's view:
[F]oreign armies are morally entitled to help victims of oppression in
overthrowing dictators, provided that the intervention is proportionate to
the evil which it is designed to suppress. A further requirement is that the
intervention be welcomed, actually or ideally, by those citizens whose
human rights are being violated.58
With some reservations concerning the proportionality rule, Tes6n's cri-
teria would appear to fit the evidence presented by Klintworth.
Tes6n provided analyses of the Indian intervention in East Pakistan
(1971), the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda (1979), the French inter-
vention in Central Africa (1979), and the U.S. intervention in Grenada
(1983), and he commented on Cambodia: "While cases like Amin's
Uganda and Pol Pot's Cambodia are clear instances of situations war-
ranting humanitarian intervention, oppression need not reach those
proportions to warrant foreign-supported overthrow."5 9
Notwithstanding Tes6n's interesting observation on Cambodia and
humanitarian intervention, it remains to be seen whether Klintworth's
scholarship will convince the majority of international lawyers to
upgrade the Vietnam-Cambodia case to the level of humanitarian inter-
vention. Klintworth predicts that "eventually, Vietnam's intervention in
Kampuchea may be judged to have been essentially justifiable. It may
even become a useful comparative model for future instances of forceful
humanitarian intervention."'60
As a book which is clearly favorable to the Vietnamese case, this
study may attract criticism from those committed to the long-established
tradition of hostility to Vietnamese actions in Southeast Asia. Such
actions are perceived to be expansionist, aggressive, and destabilizing to
the region. However, the book is worthy of attention in that it presents
a different perspective and should therefore, at least, be considered for
its alternate viewpoint. One cannot dispute its basic premise that the
Vietnamese invasion (whatever its original motivation) did succeed in
ending the genocidal nightmare of the Pol Pot Regime. Perhaps some
new perceptions are overdue in evaluating the complex politics of South
East Asian nations.
The book would have been enhanced by a detailed analysis of
Gorbachev's policies toward Vietnam, China, and Cambodia.
Gorbachev's overtures for closer ties with the Asia-Pacific region drew
world attention after his very significant speech in Vladivostok in July
1986. The Soviet leader explained his nation's hopes for improved rela-
tions with Asia and the Pacific nations. 61 His efforts to improve Sino-
57. G. KLrNTwoRTH, supra note 4, at 110.
58. F. TEs6N, supra note 55, at 15.
59. Id. at 117.
60. G. KLINTWORTH, supra note 4, at 112.
61. See generally THE SovIEr UNION AND THE ASIA-PAciFIC REGION (P. Thambipillai
& D. Matuszewski, eds. 1989).
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Soviet relations have undoubtedly had an impact on Vietnam and on
Cambodia. Klintworth could have considered the Vladivostok speech in
detail. The ensuing process of Soviet diplomacy may have generated
some apprehension in Vietnam and possibly exerted indirect pressure
on Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia.62
Klintworth ends his interesting book with a dear endorsement of
the Vietnamese role in Cambodia and of the Vietnamese achievement in
rebuilding a shattered society. Recent events since Klintworth's book
was published reveal the essential fragility of Cambodian society: the
Vietnamese are still not completely out of the country (whether or not
they wish to withdraw); the dreaded Khmer Rouge is still an active
player; and the civil war drags on, exacting its toll in human lives each
day. The future is unpredictable and frightening for the men, women,
and children of that long-suffering nation. As Indonesian Foreign Min-
ister Ali Alatas commented about Cambodia: "Now there is nothing
certain at all. No one has any idea what will happen next."63
62. IL at 138.
63. Globe and Mail (Toronto), Mar. 3, 1990, at D3, col. 1.

